Since January 1, 2020, aircraft flying in the busiest U.S. airspace (Class A, B and C, the areas around major airports, and most airspace at and above 10,000 feet) have had to broadcast their position by ADS-B (14 CFR 91.225). Much of the low-altitude airspace below that isn't covered. It's one of the best things to happen to aviation safety in my lifetime. Controllers, pilots, and now drones can see traffic that radar used to miss, and the equipment is cheap enough that a small airport or a hobbyist can put a receiver on a roof and watch the sky.
Here's the problem. ADS-B was designed to be open, not trusted. The messages are not authenticated. A receiver has no built-in way to tell a real aircraft from a false report, and security researchers have been saying so publicly for more than a decade (Strohmeier, Lenders and Martinovic, "On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol," IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17(2):1066–1087, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2014.2365951). I started my career in an Army control tower and on radar approaches, where you trusted the scope because the scope was measuring something physical. ADS-B is different. It's the aircraft reporting on itself, and everyone downstream takes its word for it.
Why this matters more now
For airliners in busy airspace, the FAA backs ADS-B up with radar and other surveillance, and satellite services such as Aireon sell independent position validation to air navigation service providers. Those are centrally run services, and for those customers they work well.
The gap is down low. Drones flying beyond visual line of sight use ADS-B In to see crewed aircraft and get out of the way. Under the FAA's proposed Part 108 rule, which is not yet final, a drone would have to yield to aircraft broadcasting ADS-B. In many places it would have the right-of-way over aircraft that aren't. The broadcast itself decides who gives way, so a false track stops being a curiosity and becomes an operational input. The proposed rule was published at 90 FR 38212 (Aug 7, 2025). The right-of-way wording may change. A final rule is due about Dec 7 under the statute. Small airports, heliports and future vertiports increasingly lean on low-cost receivers. None of them have an independent way to ask, "Is that aircraft really there?"
This year the NASA–FAA Air Domain Awareness workshops made a closely related point about drones. One industry working group concluded that operator-provided telemetry isn't enough: "independent detection capability is required to validate operator-reported positions." Its report puts it simply: "ADA integrity requires independent detection capability, not merely the aggregation of self-reported data." ADS-B is self-reported data too. To be fair, spoofing wasn't the top-ranked gap in those workshops. Aircraft that are legally invisible to electronic surveillance ranked first. But integrity of the data we do receive was named again and again.
What I proposed, and who said no
I've been working on a fix since 2023. The idea is simple to say: let many independent, low-cost ground receivers, owned by different people in different places, compare what they actually heard and when they heard it, and decide together whether a broadcast position is physically real. No single receiver is trusted. A receiver earns weight by being right. When too few receivers can hear a target, the system says "limited evidence" instead of pretending to be sure. Every verdict goes into a tamper-evident record that no single operator controls. A blockchain-style shared ledger is one way to keep that record, and it's how I first designed it, but it isn't the only way.
The approach works with ADS-B equipment already in the field. Nobody has to change a certified avionics standard.
I first drafted an early, blockchain-based version in 2023, when I was a NASA contractor working under NASA's Convergent Aeronautics Solutions project, and tried to take it forward as a NASA Contractor Report. NASA didn't take it further. In July 2025 I sent a white paper to the FAA's Advanced Air Mobility and NextGen teams and to its Aviation Research Grants program. The FAA didn't fund it. This fall the National Science Foundation's SBIR program declined two project pitches, most recently on November 11, saying they did not describe a new high-risk technical innovation.
I'm not writing this to complain. Reviewers have hard choices, and I respect the people who make them. I'm writing because the vulnerability is still there, and the rejections tell us something about where it falls. The big centralized systems serve the big customers well, so there's little reason for incumbents to build a low-cost, independent check for everyone else. Research grants want novelty on paper. Operational programs want something already fielded. A practical integrity layer for low-altitude airspace sits in between, and right now nobody owns it.
Why the reluctance?
Maybe it's simply a poor idea. If so, I can live with that. But I don't think that's the case, and so far nobody has told me it is or isn't. I've had polite no-thank-yous, and NSF's feedback was about how the innovation was described, not whether the approach works. No one has said the approach is wrong. So here are some possible reasons. These are my guesses, not anything an agency told me:
- Reputation. "Blockchain" still carries crypto baggage. Many reviewers hear speculation and energy use before they hear "tamper-evident record."
- Certification culture. Aviation rightly rewards proven systems with one accountable owner. A shared record that no single party controls doesn't fit neatly into how responsibility is assigned and signed for.
- Speed and the safety case. It's easy to assume a ledger is too slow for real-time surveillance. In this design the ledger keeps the record; it doesn't make the split-second call.
- Grant framing. Research programs want a brand-new technology. Combining proven pieces (ADS-B, receiver timing, a shared ledger) can read as integration rather than invention, even when the combination is the new part.
Outside the cockpit, aviation has already explored blockchain and, in places, put it to work, mostly for parts and maintenance records, where a tamper-evident shared record matters. IATA's 2018 white paper pointed to tracking spare parts as they change hands, and a 2021 IEEE review covered maintenance, repair and overhaul uses (IATA, Blockchain in Aviation: Exploring the Fundamentals, Use Cases, and Industry Initiatives, white paper, October 2018, https://www.iata.org/contentassets/2d997082f3c84c7cba001f506edd2c2e/blockchain-in-aviation-white-paper.pdf; R. W. Ahmad, K. Salah, R. Jayaraman, H. R. Hasan, I. Yaqoob and M. Omar, "The Role of Blockchain Technology in Aviation Industry," IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine 36(3):4–15, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2020.3043152). In 2024, Air France Industries KLM Engineering & Maintenance and Parker Aerospace went live with a blockchain-based track-and-trace system for Boeing 787 parts. ADS-B is foundational to the airspace we're building, and drones and autonomous aircraft will soon be everywhere in it. Shouldn't we look at every possibility before ruling one out?
What would close the gap
I don't think the answer has to be my design. It does have to include a few things:
- Independence. The check can't depend on the same broadcast it's checking, or on one operator everyone must trust.
- Honesty about uncertainty. A simple verified, suspect, or limited-evidence flag, close to the simple red/yellow/green scoring that industry participants at the NASA–FAA workshop favored, beats false confidence.
- Low cost on existing hardware. Drone operators and small airports won't buy new avionics. They will use software on receivers they already own.
- A home. Someone has to fund, test and stand behind it. That might be an FAA program, a state drone test site, a university partnership, or industry operators pooling their receivers.
An invitation
If you run a UTM service, operate drones beyond visual line of sight, manage a small airport or vertiport, or work on Air Domain Awareness, I'd like to talk. The same goes for anyone at an agency or a university who sees a path to testing this. The work is done to the point where the next step is real data from real receivers.
ADS-B gave us a shared picture of the sky. Before we let autonomous aircraft make decisions from that picture, we should be able to prove it's true.
Richard Walsh is the founder of a3i global aeronautics advisors, LLC, a former NASA contractor, and a former airport director with 30+ years in aviation.
