Regulatory and policy analysis. This is general information, not legal advice. Written with AI tools; the views are my own.
Four hours that tested every system at once
At about 3:30 p.m. Eastern on November 13, the FAA’s main telecommunications network began to choke. The agency says data flooded the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network “at a rate of 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds.” It traced the flood to a radar site in Texas and a radio site at El Dorado, Arkansas, where L3Harris was installing a new router. Legacy equipment became unstable at 17 of the 22 en route centers. About 3,500 airborne aircraft landed safely, and traffic resumed at 8:15 p.m.1 On November 17, Secretary of Transportation Sean P. Duffy told senators that investigators, with FBI help, had recreated the overload in a lab. It was the router’s 69th installation and the first to misbehave; the root cause was still unknown. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford has taken the blame: “I am the chief accountability officer. I take full responsibility for it.”2
I started my career as an Army air traffic controller, and the first lesson in a tower is that the scope only tells you what the wires deliver. When the wires failed, airlines lost a day of schedule, and AOPA says general aviation pilots got confusing guidance about flying under visual rules.3 Within four days, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) was asking whether the government should run air traffic control at all.
Why an outage becomes a funding story. November 13 was a technology failure: a new part on an aging network, mid-upgrade. The FAA says it “underscores the importance of modernizing our aging infrastructure.”1 Modernization is a money and management problem. Secretary Duffy wants $50.1 billion more, and the work has run for years on stop-start funding. Privatization is pitched as a different way to pay for and govern it. But one account pays for most of the FAA. The Airport and Airway Trust Fund supplied about 93 percent of the agency’s fiscal 2025 budget. It funds air traffic equipment and part of air traffic operations and, from the same pool, airport grants and the Essential Air Service program for small communities.4 Electric aircraft and vertiports will use the National Airspace System (NAS) while paying little fuel tax into it. So changing who runs and pays for air traffic control changes who pays for, and what gets, everything else. This piece follows that money past the tower and offers a fix for each obstacle.
What is actually on the table
On November 17, Senator Paul posted that “Congress should consider privatizing Air Traffic Control.”5 The next day he said he was “looking to introduce legislation to fix the FAA at zero new cost to the taxpayer,” and asked whether the government even owns the fiber network it paid to upgrade.6 His sharper fight is with Secretary Duffy’s $50.1 billion modernization request. Senator Paul wants the unspent part of last year’s $12.5 billion used first.7 As of November 18, congress.gov showed no FAA or air traffic control bill from Senator Paul, so there is nothing to evaluate yet.8
Washington has been moving the other way. Secretary Duffy took privatization “off the table” in August 2025.9 The fiscal 2026 funding law (Pub. L. 119-75, signed February 3, 2026) bars funds “in this or any other Act” to “plan, design, or implement the privatization or separation of the air traffic organization functions.” The continuing resolution carries it through December 11, and both fiscal 2027 bills repeat it.10 On November 17, House Transportation and Infrastructure Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Rick Larsen, with Senate Commerce Chairman Ted Cruz and Ranking Member Maria Cantwell, announced an agreement in principle on aviation safety legislation, including an ADS-B In mandate, following the January 2025 midair collision near Reagan National; Congress’s first aviation move after November 13 was to fix safety technology inside the current structure, not to change who owns it.11 A coalition of more than 60 organizations, including the controllers’ union (NATCA), Airlines for America, AOPA, NBAA and the airport associations, backs funded modernization instead.12 DOT’s request has five parts, and $20 billion of it is for airport infrastructure and terminals, not air traffic control.13
SpaceX’s Elon Musk said he had offered the FAA free Starlink service; Secretary Duffy replied that the FAA prefers a ground-based network.14 The outage was a fault inside the ground network, not a lost link, and the FAA told lawmakers in 2025 that satellite service would not be the “sole communications technology for safety-critical air traffic services.”15
The idea is not new; the House came close in 2016–2018, and its supporters have real evidence.
First principles: airspace in the electric era
Most privatization debates start with institutions. I’d rather start with the thing being governed.
Airspace is two things at once. It is a public, sovereign resource, and it is a real-time safety system. Every country I reviewed kept the government as the safety regulator, including those that spun off their air navigation service provider (ANSP). ICAO, the UN aviation body, asks that the regulator and the service provider be clearly separated, but it does not require privatization.16
It needs a short list of services. Those are separation and traffic flow; communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS); information services such as flight plans, NOTAMs and weather; procedure and airspace design; certification and oversight; and, on the ground, runways, pads and energy.
It has many kinds of users. Airlines and cargo carriers fly high; business and private aviation, the military and public safety fly everywhere. Drones and advanced air mobility (AAM) aircraft, such as electric air taxis, will fly low, short and often.
Electrification changes the inputs. Three changes matter most.
First, an electric aircraft burns no fuel, so it pays no fuel tax into the fund that would pay for modernization. The Trust Fund (AATF) is filled by aviation excise taxes.17 Fuel taxes worked as a user charge because fuel burned tracked use of the system. Electricity breaks that link. When I was a NASA contractor, I studied this question for my 2025 NASA Contractor Report. For the AAM flights the FAA forecasts, I found that electric operations, converted to avgas-equivalent gallons, mean a loss of about 64 percent of the annual gallons, fuel sales and excise tax those flights would otherwise produce, in both low and base forecasts. Today’s general aviation fuel taxes are a small slice of the fund: about $277 million of $11.4 billion, roughly 2.4 percent, of fiscal 2022 tax revenue in my report, and about 2 percent in the FAA’s latest fact sheet. Passengers pay about 93 percent of Trust Fund receipts through ticket, segment and international taxes.184 The national hit is small now; it lands first at small and rural airports and grows with electric flying.
The same report warned against the obvious fix. Converting kilowatt-hours to “gallon equivalents” and taxing them at the avgas rate “may not be the best framework,” I wrote. Even with an efficiency factor that reaches tax parity, it “may fall short” of what an electrified system will need.18 So I am not recommending a straight per-kilowatt-hour tax here, and I don’t think the evidence supports one.
Second, operations get more frequent, shorter and lower. That shifts demand away from high-altitude en route control and toward terminal areas, low-altitude traffic management (UTM) and data services. The rules to scale it, Part 108 (drone flights beyond visual line of sight) and Part 146 (automated data service providers), were proposed together in August 2025; the final rule has been under White House review since July 10, 2026, with a statutory deadline of about December 7.19
Third, energy becomes airport infrastructure: chargers, ground power and grid capacity. GAO reports that, according to the FAA, 47 airports had identified electric-aircraft charging stations in their airport plans as of December 2025, and that no crewed electric aircraft had been type-certificated as of March 2026.20 Our Next Wave No. 3, Chargers Before Certificates (November 19), covers why the power has to come first.21
What follows from those basics. Six design principles fall out:
- Funding should track the service used, not the fuel burned. Fuel was only ever a stand-in for use.
- Charges must not price out the frequent, small, low-altitude users an electric system depends on.
- Capital for ground energy must reach small and rural airports, not only hubs. There will never be enough for every site, so it has to be ranked well; that’s the subject of my forthcoming New Systems, Old Budgets (November 30).22
- The regulator must be independent of the operator, whoever owns the operator.
- Governance must give a voice to users who don’t yet exist in volume, such as AAM operators and drone service providers.
- The system must survive shutdowns and single points of failure.
A reformed FAA could meet these principles, and so could a commercialized ANSP. Ownership is a means, not the test.
What other countries show, both ways
No country “privatized its airspace.” Countries commercialized their air traffic service providers and kept a government safety regulator:
| Canada | United Kingdom | Australia | Germany | New Zealand | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | NAV CANADA, private nonprofit with no shareholders (1996) | NATS, public-private partnership; airline group owns 42% (2001) | Airservices, government-owned corporation | DFS, state-owned company; a 2006 sale was vetoed as unconstitutional | Airways, state-owned enterprise (1987) |
| For | Strong safety and technology record; can issue bonds (self-reported) | Average delay down from 100+ seconds per flight to “a few seconds” (self-reported) | Tower service variations fell 47% in FY2025 | Runs a drone traffic service through Droniq, a joint venture | GAO cites its close coordination with the regulator |
| Against | 29.5% rate hike in 2020; controller shortages in 2025–26 | August 2023 flight-plan failure hit 700,000+ people | Post-COVID tower closures and reduced hours | — | GA prices set to rise 8.8% over FY2023–25 |
Sources: notes 23–24.
The pattern is the point. Commercialized providers did not escape outages or staffing crises, and public ones didn’t either. NAV CANADA’s 2020 hike shows what happens when there is no general-fund backstop, because a fee-funded provider passes a demand shock straight to users. NATS needed a refinancing after 9/11.23 Resilience engineering, funding buffers and governance decided outcomes. Ownership did not.24
The system of systems: how one change spreads
The 2017 House bill, the 21st Century AIRR Act (H.R. 2997), is the most detailed recent design, so it is my reference case for how a change would travel.
1. ATC operations. A corporation would run separation and flow under a board. The 2017 bill used fees set under ICAO cost-based principles and exempted Part 91, 133, 135, 136 and 137 operators and the military. It also guaranteed that no user could be denied service for being fee-exempt.25
2. Communications, navigation and surveillance. This is where November 13 happened. Harris won the FTI network in 2002; its successor, FENS, went to Verizon in 2023. The modernization integrator is Peraton, under a contract with a $1.5 billion ceiling.26 Secretary Duffy put the problem bluntly: “they own the network. I can’t cancel the network that they own.”27 A corporation would inherit that lock-in.
3. Funding. This is the link between November 13 and everything below. Operations and facilities and equipment are about 80 percent of fiscal 2026 FAA authorizations (about $17 billion of $21.3 billion). Airport grants are about 19 percent.28 The 2017 bill kept the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) on the Trust Fund but ended Trust Fund money for ATC operations and equipment once the corporation took over.25 The White House principles that year called for sunsetting ATC taxes “except those necessary to continue to fund the Airport Improvement Program.”29 The likely result is a smaller airports-and-safety fund, with fuel-tax erosion landing on what’s left.
4. Airports and the NPIAS. Airports are where a change in ATC funding lands first. The National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) lists 3,287 existing public-use facilities eligible for AIP.30 In 2017 the airport groups treated ATC structure as negotiable and airport funding as the dealbreaker. ACI-NA opposed the bill “so long as it does not include the ability for airports to fund critically needed infrastructure,” meaning a higher passenger facility charge (PFC).31 The pressure point would be discretionary AIP, which small airports depend on for big projects.
Airport privatization is a separate track. The Airport Investment Partnership Program (49 U.S.C. 47134) has produced one surviving commercial privatization in 30 years: San Juan, where Aerostar paid $615 million upfront in 2013.32 Put a fee-charging ATC corporation alongside a privatized airport, and the same passenger pays two private fee layers.
5. Regulation. The FAA would remain the regulator of certification, drone rules, vertiport standards and the new provider. The risk is a regulator hollowed out mid-transition; GAO found foreign transitions took up to seven years.33
6. Workforce. The FAA has about 11,000 certified controllers against a target of 12,563.34 Moving them during a modernization with an end-2028 target is a risk in itself.
7. Military. DoD shares radar, communications and special-use airspace. In 2017 it went from “raises concerns” to “supportive” once the bill added defense seats, emergency powers and airspace protections.35
8. Users and small communities. Essential Air Service (EAS) supports scheduled flights at 182 communities. In fiscal 2026 it was funded with $513.6 million in appropriations plus about $166.6 million from FAA overflight fees.36 Because EAS draws on the Trust Fund and on fees the FAA collects for air traffic services, it moves whenever ATC funding does.4 The 2017 bill acknowledged the FAA would “no longer be in the business of charging the overflight fees” and raised EAS authorizations to make up for it.25 That moves a dedicated stream into annual appropriations, where the fiscal 2027 request proposed cutting EAS to $142 million.36 The roughly 265 contract towers, and the ten State Block Grant states that choose AIP projects at their smaller airports, would also need explicit transition language.37
9. Energy. No ATC reform bill mentions energy, yet every electric flight depends on a charger, a utility feeder and a lease.
10. The loop. A fee design decides whether short eVTOL hops pay. That sets demand at vertiports and chargers, which sets grant need, which runs into a possibly smaller Trust Fund. That decides which small airports get power.
The case for change, stated fairly
People who want reform are not inventing their problems. In the 43-day shutdown in 2025, controllers worked without pay, and the FAA ordered flight cuts at 40 airports.38 The 2013 sequester furloughed controllers until Congress passed an emergency fix.39 On procurement, GAO found 30 major ATC programs with $4.2 billion in cost growth and delays averaging 48 months.40 ICAO’s guidance calls for a clear separation of the regulator from the service provider. It lets both report to the same top manager only if the state can show “robust checks and balances” (Doc 9734, para. 3.3.4.2). The FAA says it meets that test, because its Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV) sits in the Office of Aviation Safety, outside the Air Traffic Organization.16 Representatives Gabe Amo (D-R.I.) and Stephen F. Lynch (D-Mass.) asked GAO in 2025 to study moving AOV out of the FAA.41 That is a fair argument for reform, not proof that the FAA fails ICAO’s test. A fee-funded provider can borrow against revenue for long-lived equipment, as NAV CANADA does.23 And DOT’s Inspector General has found contract towers cost-effective with comparable safety, so outsourced delivery under federal oversight can work.37
Each problem is real, and each has a fix that doesn’t require a change of ownership.
Obstacles and solutions
Each obstacle gets at least one solution. Where a solution is a3i’s own idea rather than a bill or policy, the table says so.
| # | System | Obstacle | Solution | Type | Status / source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Funding | Shutdowns stop pay, hiring and training | Aviation Funding Stability Act: Trust Fund keeps the FAA running in a lapse (S. 1045, Senator Moran, until funding passes; H.R. 5451 and 5455, Representatives Cohen and Bean, up to 30 days). H.R. 6086, the Aviation Funding Solvency Act from Chairman Graves (Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund). Multi-year advance appropriations | Statutory | Stability bills in committee;42 H.R. 6086 ordered reported by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee by voice vote, Dec. 18, 2025;43 advance appropriations: a3i proposal |
| 2 | Funding | Fuel tax erodes as aircraft electrify | A charge based on service for electric aircraft (per flight, per service, or a flat annual fee for small aircraft), credited to the Trust Fund. Energy-equivalent pricing only as one input | Statutory | a3i proposal, built on my NASA CR’s caution18 |
| 3 | Funding | A spin-off shrinks the Trust Fund and loses the general-fund backstop | Separate safety and airport accounts, each with a general-fund floor; 10-year solvency projections | Statutory | a3i proposal |
| 4 | Airports | Discretionary AIP squeezed first; the 2024 Act’s lower PFC turnback (40%/60%, was 50%/75%) shrinks the Small Airport Fund | Keep AIP on the Trust Fund; protect small-airport and discretionary shares by formula; index the $150,000 GA/reliever entitlement | Statutory | Airport and AOPA positions, 2017;44 49 U.S.C. 47114, 47116;45 indexing: a3i proposal |
| 5 | Airports | The $4.50 PFC cap, unchanged by the 2024 Act, limits local capital | Raise and index the cap; comment on FAA’s PFC rule by Jan. 4, 2027 | Statutory / rule | 40117(b)(1);46 AAAE and ACI-NA position;31 airlines oppose; PFC supplemental NPRM47 |
| 6 | Airports | Two private fee layers at privatized airports | ICAO cost-based, nondiscriminatory charging written into any provider charter | Statutory | ICAO Doc 9082;48 a3i proposal |
| 7 | Small communities | EAS loses overflight-fee funding | Keep a dedicated EAS stream in statute | Statutory | 2017 bill showed the risk25 |
| 8 | Airports | Contract towers and block-grant states orphaned | Write both into the charter or the reauthorization | Statutory | AAAE, 201731 |
| 9 | Governance | A board weighted toward airlines | Reserved GA and new-entrant seats, or no reserved seats plus a statutory advisory board that includes drone and AAM operators | Statutory | 2016 bill’s advisory board; 2017 White House principles;29 AAM seat: a3i proposal |
| 10 | Access | Fee-exempt users squeezed out | Charter access guarantees, as in 2017 §90701–90702 and Canada’s proportionality rule | Statutory | 2549 |
| 11 | Regulation | Regulator and provider under one Administrator | Statutory independence for AOV now, drafted around the §119G bar on planning “separation” of ATO functions | Statutory | ICAO Doc 9734 para. 3.3.4.2; FAA Order 1100.161B;16 a3i proposal (analysis, not an ICAO finding) |
| 12 | CNS | One network fault grounds the country | Route and carrier diversity, tested failover, satellite as backup only | Procurement | FAA “not sole” policy;15 standards: a3i proposal |
| 13 | Procurement | “They own the network” | Government ownership of network designs and data rights in FTI/FENS and modernization contracts; public performance terms | Procurement | a3i proposal27 |
| 14 | Workforce | Transitions take years | No ownership change before modernization cutover (end-2028 target) | Policy | GAO lessons;33 a3i proposal |
| 15 | Military | Shared assets and airspace | Carry forward the 2017 defense safeguards | Statutory | 35 |
| 16 | AAM / drones | Rules lag operations | Finalize Parts 108 and 146 (one NPRM, 90 FR 38212) | FAA rule | At OIRA since July 10, 2026; statutory deadline about Dec. 719 |
| 17 | Vertiports | Design standard not final | Comment on draft AC 150/5390-4 by Jan. 11, 2027 | FAA AC | 50 |
| 18 | Energy | The grid is missing from ATC reform | Name energy as part of the NAS in planning and AIP eligibility | Statutory | a3i proposal |
| 19 | Prioritization | Not enough money for every site | A transparent, demand-informed ranking alongside NPIAS need | Policy | 22 |
| 20 | New entrants | No fair way for vertiports to pay in | Tiered obligations (next section) | Policy / statutory | a3i proposal |
| 21 | New entrants | The NPIAS heliport screen doesn’t fit vertiports | Screen on projected operations and network role | FAA order | a3i proposal |
| 22 | New entrants | On-demand air taxis of 6,000 lb or less may avoid the ticket tax | Review the exemption, or replace it with a per-flight charge | Statutory | a3i proposal51 |
| 23 | New entrants | PFCs only at commercial-service airports | A capped facility charge for public-use vertiports that accept full obligations | Statutory | a3i proposal |
| 24 | New entrants | The vertiport AC is late | Finalize it in 2027 with the dual-use mechanism the statute requires | FAA AC | 2024 Act §95852 |
By my count, 19 of the 24 fixes work no matter who owns ATC. The other five (rows 3, 6, 9, 10 and 15) matter only if Congress creates a separate provider. In short: most of what went wrong, and most of what electric aircraft will need, can be fixed now.
The electric lens: what each model would do
Whoever pays for the new system will collect from tomorrow’s fleet, which is why electric aircraft belong in an outage story. Neither model handles them well by default.
Under today’s FAA, the drone and AAM rules are moving slowly.19 Meanwhile the Trust Fund base erodes as fuel tax falls, and every shutdown stalls rulemaking.
A commercialized provider would recover its costs through fees regardless of fuel type, so for ATC funding the fuel-tax problem largely goes away. Two catches follow. The 2017 design exempted Part 135 air taxis, which many eVTOL services may be, shifting their cost to airlines.25 And the Trust Fund that remained, funding airports, would still rest on fuel and ticket taxes, so electrification would hit it harder in proportion. NAV CANADA’s flat annual fee for aircraft of 3 tonnes or less shows a fee schedule can be kind to frequent small flyers,49 but its drone traffic concept excludes AAM, and an airline-weighted board could rank new entrants last.53
New entrants: how vertiports and vertipads should pay in
New entrants will depend on the modernized system from their first flight, whoever runs it. Vertiports and vertipads will use the airspace, charts, procedures, controllers or UTM providers and, at airports, the shared airfield. How should they pay into that system? And if they join the national plan, what obligations should come with it?
Where the rules stand. In the 2024 FAA Reauthorization Act, a vertiport is “an area of land, water, or a structure used or intended to be used to support the landing, takeoff, taxiing, parking, and storage of powered-lift aircraft or other aircraft that vertiport design and performance standards established by the Administrator can accommodate” (§951(5)). The FAA adds that “Vertiports are a type of heliport.”50 Design guidance today is Engineering Brief 105A, which covers piloted eVTOL aircraft in good weather up to 12,500 pounds. Section 958 required a performance-based vertiport advisory circular by December 31, 2025. The draft, AC 150/5390-4, appeared October 22, 2026, with comments due January 11, 2027; it will replace EB 105A and the heliport design AC.5052 (I covered the draft in an earlier a3i piece.54)
Heliports show where vertiports start. The NPIAS includes 8 heliports. There are 55 public-use heliports and 6,130 private-use ones.30 A heliport generally gets into the NPIAS only if it is publicly owned and open to the public, has an eligible sponsor, has at least four based rotorcraft for two years and 400 annual IFR flights, and is in the state system plan.55 An air-taxi pad that turns aircraft based elsewhere will struggle with a based-aircraft test, as we noted in Destinations, Not Hangars.56
I found no provision in the 2024 Act that makes vertiports eligible for AIP as a class, and the FAA’s guidance implementing the Act lists none.57 There are two narrower paths: the §745 Electric Aircraft Infrastructure Pilot, for up to ten airports, and the AAM Infrastructure Pilot Program, with planning grants of up to $1.0 million each. Section 960 authorized it through fiscal 2026, and no grant may be awarded after September 30, 2026. The fiscal 2027 bills would re-fund it at $12.5 million with a $1.5 million cap, but they are not law. Its money comes from FAA Operations, not AIP, so the AIP assurances would not attach automatically.5258
What joining the system means. An airport that takes AIP money signs the sponsor assurances. The current April 2025 set has 40 of them; the 40th, on access to leaded avgas, is new.59 A planning grant carries only some, including #23 and #25; the operating and fee assurances (#19, #22, #24, #29) attach with development grants. Every airport I’ve worked for ran under them. The key ones here:
- #19, operation and maintenance;
- #22, economic nondiscrimination, which requires access “to all types, kinds and classes of aeronautical activities”;
- #23, no exclusive rights;
- #24, a fee structure that makes the airport “as self-sustaining as possible”;
- #25, airport revenue stays at the airport;
- #29, an up-to-date Airport Layout Plan.
Most assurances last for the useful life of the project, up to 20 years. The exclusive-rights and revenue assurances have no limit “so long as the airport is used as an airport,” and neither do the obligations on land bought with federal money. Assurance #34 also makes current FAA advisory circulars binding on AIP projects, so a final vertiport AC would govern federally funded vertiport work.59 The FAA’s revenue-use policy applies as well.60 Airport certification under Part 139 does not apply to heliports.61 Since the FAA defines a vertiport as a type of heliport, my reading is that a standalone vertiport falls outside Part 139 as well; the FAA has not ruled on it. The UAE has gone further: on November 18 Dubai announced its second certified vertiport, at Dubai Marina.62
A vertiport built on an obligated airport inherits all of this. It has to appear on the Airport Layout Plan, sponsor-owned chargers must be open to all users, and operators keep the right to self-charge. The FAA also says that “exclusive-use AAM leased property with proprietary charging stations are not considered an exclusive-right.”50 A private-use pad, by contrast, files a Part 157 notice 90 days ahead, receives an advisory airspace determination, and carries no federal grant obligations at all.63
What is already collected, and what isn’t. Commercial passenger flights pay the federal ticket tax. But 26 U.S.C. 4281 exempts aircraft of 6,000 pounds or less unless they fly an “established line” or are jet aircraft. Rotorcraft and propeller aircraft are not jets under the law, and sightseeing flights do not count as an established line.51 Scheduled air-taxi routes probably count as established lines; on-demand flights may not. That is my reading; I found no Treasury guidance on it. The aircraft straddle the line: the FAA’s airworthiness criteria list the Joby JAS4-1 at 4,800 pounds maximum takeoff weight and the Archer Midnight at 6,500.51 PFCs are available only at commercial service airports run by public agencies.46
The ways a vertiport could pay in. There are seven options:
- Landing and use fees set by the owner, cost-based and, at NPIAS sites, required to be reasonable.
- A per-passenger facility charge, which today requires commercial service status; extending it takes a change in law.
- A per-flight or per-service ATC or UTM charge, workable under either ownership model, with a flat annual option for light aircraft so frequent short hops aren’t punished.
- An airport-level charging fee, such as the hourly or electricity flowage fees my NASA report described.18 This is local revenue, not a federal tax.
- A Trust Fund contribution through the existing ticket tax, with the small-aircraft exemption reviewed for on-demand electric service.
- Low-altitude service fees paid to UTM providers under Part 146. Who pays whom is still open.
- The public-use bargain: take grant money and accept access and nondiscrimination duties in return, as every NPIAS airport does today.
A tiered obligation framework (a3i proposal).
| Tier | What it is | Obligations | Eligible for | How it pays in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Private use | Hospital, corporate or operator-only pad | Part 157 notice; design to the AC; local zoning and fire code; keep the FAA’s master record current | Private capital only | Users’ federal charges (ticket tax where it applies; any future per-flight or UTM charge) |
| 2. Public use, no federal grants | City, state or private pad open to all operators | Tier 1, plus published rates, open access as a local or state condition, and operations data reported to the FAA | State grants; AAM planning grants if Congress re-funds them | Landing, use and charging fees; users’ federal charges |
| 3. Federally funded | NPIAS vertiport, or a vertiport on an obligated airport | The applicable assurances (development grants carry #19, #22–25, #29 and #34; #39 applies only to medium and large hubs); revenue-use policy; the host airport’s Part 139 manual where it applies | AIP and §745 where eligible; a capped facility charge if Congress allows | Cost-based fees under #24; the public-use bargain |
I would add an on-ramp between Tiers 2 and 3. A public-use vertiport that commits to Tier 3 access terms could be screened for the NPIAS on projected operations and its role in a network rather than on based aircraft. New Systems, Old Budgets sets out how to rank those sites,22 and Chargers Before Certificates covers who owns the charger.21
What any reform must answer
Any proposal, from legislation Senator Paul may introduce to a revived AIRR Act, should pass eleven tests:
- Is ATC shutdown-proof?
- Does funding track the service used rather than the fuel burned?
- Are small and rural airports’ grant shares protected?
- Does EAS keep a dedicated funding stream?
- Is access guaranteed for every class of user?
- Do GA and new entrants have a voice in governance?
- Is the safety regulator independent of the provider?
- Is CNS redundancy required and tested?
- Is any transition sequenced after the modernization cutover?
- Is energy treated as part of the NAS?
- Do vertiports have a fair, tiered way to pay in?
Today’s system fails 1, 2 and 10, among others. The 2017 bill did better on 5 and 7 but failed 4 and left 2 and 9 open. Senator Paul’s proposal can’t be scored until there is bill text.
a3i’s read
November 13 was a systems failure, not an ownership failure. A contractor-run network failed during a change inside a public agency; Britain’s flight-plan system failed in 2023 inside a public-private partnership. Ownership was not the common cause. The fix is modernization, and modernization is a funding decision that reaches every airport, small community and new entrant.
The more useful question is not “privatize, yes or no?” It’s which of these fixes Congress and the FAA will make now. Electric aircraft will wear down the fuel-tax model no matter who runs the towers, and the vertiport question has to be answered before the first networks are built.
As a contractor at NASA Ames, I managed programs at FutureFlight Central and the Vertical Motion Simulator, where ideas are tested before they reach a live airport. The policy equivalent is open now. Readers can comment on the FAA’s draft vertiport design AC through January 11, 2027, by sending the FAA’s comment matrix to vertiports@faa.gov.50
About the author. Richard S. Walsh, M.Sc., A.A.E., is the Founder of a3i global aeronautics advisors, LLC, and a former NASA contractor with more than 30 years in aviation. He began as a U.S. Army air traffic controller. He served as Airport Director (CEO) of Palm Springs International Airport, Associate Deputy Airport Director at San Francisco International Airport, and Director of Planning & Environmental Affairs at the Allegheny County Airport Authority (Pittsburgh International and Allegheny County airports). At NASA Ames he was a contractor program manager for FutureFlight Central and the Vertical Motion Simulator. He is the sole author of the NASA Contractor Report Assessing the Electrification of Aviation’s Impact on the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.

